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A continuous key distribution scheme is proposed that relies on a pair of canonically conjugate
quantum variables. It allows two remote parties to share a secret Gaussian key by encoding it
into one of the two quadrature components of a single-mode electromagnetic field. The resulting
quantum cryptographic information vs disturbance tradeoff is investigated for an individual attack
based on the optimal continuous cloning machine. It is shown that the information gained by the
eavesdropper then simply equals the information lost by the receiver.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Bz, 42.50.-p, 89.70.+c
Quantum cryptography—or, more precisely, quantum
key distribution—is a technique that allows two remote
parties to share a secret chain of random bits (a secret
key) that can be used for exchanging encrypted infor-
mation [1–3]. The security of this process fundamen-
tally relies on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, or
on the fact that any measurement of incompatible vari-
ables inevitably affects the state of a quantum system.
Any leak of information to an eavesdropper necessarily
induces a disturbance of the system, which is, in princi-
ple, detectable by the authorized receiver.
In most quantum cryptosystems proposed so far, a sin-
gle photon (or, in practice, a weak coherent state with an
average photon number lower than one) is used to carry
each bit of the key. Mathematically, the security is based
on the use of a pair of non-commuting observables such
as the x- and z-projections of a spin-1/2 particle, σx and
σz , whose eigenstates are used to encode the key. The
sender (Alice) randomly chooses to encode the key using
either σz (0 is encoded as | ↑〉 and 1 as | ↓〉) or σx (0 is en-
coded as 2−1/2(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉) and 1 as 2−1/2(| ↑〉−| ↓〉)), the
choice of the basis being disclosed only after the receiver
(Bob) has measured the photon. This guarantees that an
eavesdropper (Eve) cannot read the key without corrupt-
ing the transmission. Such a procedure, known as BB84
[1], is at the heart of most of the quantum cryptographic
schemes that have been experimentally demonstrated in
the past few years, which are based either on the polar-
ization (e. g. [4,5]) or the optical phase (e. g. [6]) of single
photons. An alternative scheme, realized experimentally
only a year ago [7–9], can also be used based on a pair of
polarization-entangled photons instead of single photons
[10]. It is, however, fundamentally equivalent to BB84
(see [11]) and it again relies on the algebra of spin-1/2
particles.
Recently, it has been shown that another protocol for
quantum key distribution can be devised based on con-
tinuous variables, where squeezed coherent light modes
are used to carry the key [12–14]. In these techniques,
one exploits a pair of (continuous) canonical variables
such as the two quadratures X1 and X2 of the ampli-
tude of a mode of the electromagnetic field, which be-
have just as position and momentum. The uncertainty
relation ∆X1 ∆X2 ≥ 1/4 then implies than Eve can-
not read both quadrature components without degrading
the state. Even though the experimental preparation of
squeezed states is a difficult task, these schemes circum-
vent a main weakness of the above-mentioned cryptosys-
tems that is the critical dependence of their security on
the ability of preparing single-photon states.
In this paper, we propose an alternative squeezed-state
quantum cryptographic scheme, which provides a means
to distribute a continuous secret key. The goal of our
protocol is to have Alice and Bob sharing a continuous
key that consists of a random list of Gaussian-distributed
variables that cannot be known to Eve. Thus, in this sce-
nario, both the key and the quantum variable that carries
it are continuous. This is in contrast with the schemes
proposed in Ref. [12–14], which appear hybrid as a con-
tinuous quantum variable was used to carry a discrete
key element (the shared key was made of bits, or, in
general, discrete variables). Instead, our approach can
be viewed as an all-continuous quantum cryptographic
scheme, which is the proper continuous extension of the
BB84 scheme. First, from a theoretical perspective, this
provides a more satisfying continuous treatment of quan-
tum key distribution. Remarkably, the tradeoff between
Eve’s information gain and the disturbance at Bob’s sta-
tion can be expressed in an unexpectedly simple way (if
we restrict ourselves to an individual attack based on the
optimal continuous cloning machine): the information
gained by Eve on one quadrature is at most equal to the
information lost by Bob on the other quadrature. This re-
sults in a simple information-theoretic measure of the dis-
turbance, namely the defect of information at Bob’s sta-
tion. Moreover, this all-continuous scheme avoids a po-
tential attack against the scheme proposed in Ref. [12–14]
by filling in the gaps between the values used to encode
the discrete key values (this will be explained later on).
Let us now detail our protocol. The uncertainty re-
lation implies that it is impossible to measure with full
accuracy both quadratures of a single mode, X1 and X2.
Alice exploits this property by encoding the key elements
(random Gaussian samples) as a quadrature squeezed
1
state either in X1 or in X2, in such a way that an eaves-
dropper ignoring which of these two “bases” is used can-
not acquire information without disturbing the state. In
basis 1, Alice prepares a squeezed vacuum state such that
the fluctuations of X1 are squeezed (∆X
2
1 = σ
2
1 < 1/4),
and then applies a displacement of X1 by an amount
equal to the value of the Gaussian key (〈X1〉 = x, where
x is the encoded key element). The quantity σ21 refers
here to the intrinsic variance of X1 in the squeezed state;
the corresponding squeeze parameter is r1 = − ln(2σ1).
We denote by Σ21 the variance of this Gaussian key, so
the mean value 〈X1〉 is itself distributed as a Gaussian
of mean 0 and variance Σ21. Conversely, in basis 2, Alice
sends a squeezed state in X2 (∆X
2
2 = σ
2
2 < 1/4), whose
displacement encodes the Gaussian key (〈X2〉 = x).
Again, 〈X2〉 has a Gaussian profile with mean 0 and
variance Σ22, while the squeeze parameter in mode 2 is
r2 = − ln(2σ2). Thus, in both basis, Alice encodes the
key into a displaced vacuum squeezed state, the squeezing
(by r) and displacement (by x) being applied at random
on X1 or X2.
Now, for the cryptographic setup to be secure, we re-
quire the statistical distribution of the X1 measurement
outcomes to be indistinguishable whether basis 1 or 2
is used by Alice. If this condition is fulfilled, Eve can-
not obtain any indication on whether she is measuring
a type 1 or type 2 squeezed state, whatever the statis-
tics she accumulates. If basis 1 is used, the outcomes
of X1 measurements (that can be obtained in practice
by homodyne detection) are distributed as a Gaussian of
variance Σ21+σ
2
1 since each squeezed state gives an extra
contribution of σ21 to the variance. If, on the contrary,
a type 2 squeezed state is measured, then the outcomes
of X1 measurements exhibit a Gaussian distribution of
variance 1/(16σ22) as a result of the uncertainty princi-
ple. Thus, we impose the condition
Σ21 + σ
2
1 = 1/(16σ
2
2) (1)
Similarly, the requirement that type 1 and 2 squeezed
states are indistinguishable when performing X2 mea-
surements implies that Σ22 + σ
2
2 = 1/(16σ
2
1). These two
relations can be summarized as
1 + Σ21/σ
2
1 = 1 + Σ
2
2/σ
2
2 = 1/α
2 (2)
where α = 4 σ1σ2 = e
−(r1+r2) is a (positive) dimension-
less constant which must satisfy α ≤ 1 (or σ1σ2 ≤ 1/4)
for Eq. (2) to be consistent. More generally, these two
conditions guarantee that the density matrices of the en-
coded key elements are the same in bases 1 and 2, making
them indistinguishable. Thus, choosing the squeeze pa-
rameters r1 and r2 is sufficient to completely characterize
the protocol.
Let us now analyze the transmission of the Gaussian
key elements in the case where there is no eavesdropper
and the transmission is perfect. We first need to recall
some standard notions of Shannon theory concerning the
treatment of continuous transmission channels. Consider
a discrete-time continuous channel which adds a Gaus-
sian noise of variance σ2 on each signal. If the input x of
the channel is a Gaussian signal of variance Σ2, the uncer-
tainty on x can be measured by the differential Shannon
entropy h(x) = 2−1 log2(2pi eΣ
2) bits [15]. Conditionally
on x, the output y is distributed as a Gaussian of variance
σ2, so that the entropy of y conditionally on x becomes
h(y|x) = 2−1 log2(2pi eσ2) bits. Now, the distribution
of y is given by the convolution of these two Gaussians,
i. e., a Gaussian of variance Σ2 + σ2. Hence, the output
entropy is h(y) = 2−1 log2(2pi e (Σ
2 + σ2)) bits. Accord-
ing to Shannon theory, the information that is processed
through this noisy channel can be expressed as the mu-
tual information between x and y (the amount by which
the uncertainty on y is reduced by knowing x):
I (bits) = h(y)− h(y|x) = 1
2
log2 (1 + γ) (3)
where γ = Σ2/σ2 can be viewed as the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR). This is Shannon’s famous formula for the
capacity of a Gaussian additive noise channel [16]. Here,
the signal variance (or power) is simply Σ2, while the
noise variance is σ2. This capacity measures the num-
ber of bits that can be transmitted asymptotically (using
block coding) per use of the channel, with an arbitrary
high fidelity for a given SNR. It can be shown to be at-
tainable if the signal is Gaussian distributed (which is
the case under consideration here).
Coming back to our cryptographic setup, consider the
situation (with no eavesdropping) where Bob performs a
measurement in the good basis after the latter is publicly
announced by Alice. (It is equivalent to the more realis-
tic procedure where Bob measures the key in a random
basis, but then discards the bad outcomes after the ba-
sis is disclosed by Alice.) The SNR in basis 1 is simply
γ1 = Σ
2
1/σ
2
1 , while it is γ2 = Σ
2
2/σ
2
2 in basis 2. Using
this notation, Eq. (2) becomes 1 + γ1 = 1 + γ2 = 1/α
2,
so that we must have the same SNR in both basis,
γ = e2(r1+r2) − 1. This means that the processed in-
formation is also the same in both bases, and can be
expressed, using Eq. (3), as
I0 (bits) = − log2(α) = (r1 + r2)/ ln(2) (4)
Thus, our continuous quantum cryptographic technique
can be essentially characterized by a single dimension-
less constant α (the product of the X1 noise of type-1
squeezed states times the X2 noise of type-2 squeezed
states). It works provided that α ≤ 1, as a finite amount
of information is then processed from Alice to Bob. Note
that I0 (expressed in natural units—nats—rather than
in bits) is simply equal to the sum of the squeeze param-
eters in bases 1 and 2, which reflects that the processed
information is zero in the absence of squeezing, and grows
linearly with squeezing in bases 1 and 2. For example, if
σ21 = σ
2
2 = 1/8, i. e., if we have a squeeze factor e
r =
√
2
in each basis, then α = 1/2, so we can process one bit on
2
average per use of the channel. This corresponds to γ = 3
in both bases. More generally, we see that the processed
information in the absence of eavesdropping increases as
α gets smaller. In some sense, the more we violate a
pseudo-uncertainty relation σ1σ2 ≥ 1/4, the larger this
information gets. Remember that σ1 and σ2 are standard
deviations of X1 and X2 measurements on type 1 and 2
states, respectively. If they referred to X1 and X2 mea-
surements on a same state, then the above uncertainty
relation would apply, and Eq. (2) could not be satisfied
(except for the useless case α = 1).
The average photon number contained in each encoded
key state clearly increases with the widening of the dis-
placement (Σ2) needed to represent Alice’s key values for
a given SNR. It also increases as squeezing increases, but
then the displacement distribution can be narrowed to
achieve a same SNR. Let us determine the relative con-
tribution of these two effects focusing on one basis, and
assuming for simplicity that σ1 = σ2 = σ so that the
same squeezing is applied on both quadratures. In this
case, Eq. (2) implies that σ2 = 14e
−2r, Σ2 = 12 sinh(2r),
and 1 + γ = e4r. For a given encoded key state (with
a squeeze parameter r and displacement x, where x is
the key value Alice wishes to transmit), the mean pho-
ton number can be written as N = x2 + sinh2 r, where
the first term reflects the displacement effect while the
second characterizes vacuum squeezing [17]. For a given
SNR γ (or a given squeezing parameter r), we obtain the
average number of photons over all possible values x sent
by Alice (distributed as a Gaussian of mean 0 and vari-
ance Σ2), 〈N〉 = Σ2+sinh2 r. Using the relation between
γ and r, this gives for the average number of photons per
key pulse:
〈N〉 = 1− α
2α
=
e2r − 1
2
=
(1 + γ)1/2 − 1
2
(5)
Equivalently, the processed information can be expressed
as a function of the average photon number,
I0 (bits) = log2(2 〈N〉+ 1) (6)
implying that the photon number must increase expo-
nentially with the processed information.
We shall now investigate the tradeoff between the in-
formation acquired by Bob and Eve in this continuous
cryptographic protocol. First, we should emphasize that,
even in the absence of eavesdropping, the key elements
received by Bob are not exactly equal to those sent by
Alice. This is in contrast with BB84, and is simply due
to the fact that the noise due to the intrinsic fluctuations
of the squeezed states always adds to the signal, giving
rise to a finite SNR. This already holds at Alice’s station,
regardless the (possibly tapped) channel. So, an eaves-
dropper will be visible in this scheme by an enhanced
noise variance (or a reduced SNR) at Bob’s station. A
protocol that Alice can follow to detect any eavesdrop-
ping can be to disclose, on a public channel, the exact
values x of a random subset of key elements. Then, Bob
compares them to the received values y and computes
the distribution of the differences y − x. For a perfect
and untapped channel, it should be a Gaussian of vari-
ance σ2, so the SNR is unchanged. Otherwise, the SNR
decreases by an amount that can be viewed as a measure
of the disturbance of the Alice-to-Bob channel. Assume,
for example, that Eve uses an individual “intercept-and-
resend” attack, measuring each key element in basis 1 or
2, at random, and resending a squeezed state centered on
the value of the measured quadrature. The variance at
Bob’s station is 2σ2 (twice the intrinsic variance!) if Eve
used the good basis, or 1/(16σ2) in the opposite case,
so the resulting noise variance is σ2[1 + 1/(2α2)]. Thus
Bob’s computed SNR is reduced by a factor 2/(3 + γ).
Let us now make the assumption that the optimal in-
dividual eavesdropping strategy for Eve consists in using
the optimal (Gaussian) cloning machine for continuous
quantum variables [18,19]. This is a very sensible conjec-
ture as the phase-covariant qubit cloner is known to be
the best individual eavesdropping strategy for BB84 [20]
(actually, the universal qubit cloner is optimal for the re-
lated six-state quantum cryptographic protocol [21,22]).
We consider an attack where Eve makes two imperfect
copies of the key element, and sends one of them to Bob
while she keeps the other one. Bob and Eve both wait
until Alice reveals the basis she used for encoding the
key before measuring the received state in the appropri-
ate basis (again, this is equivalent to Bob measuring in a
random basis and then discarding the bad measurements
after the basis disclosure). To analyze the information-
theoretic balance between Bob and Eve, we use a general
class of asymmetric Gaussian cloners defined in Ref. [18]
that result in a different amount of noise on both quadra-
tures and for Bob and Eve. It is proven in Ref. [18] that
the inequality
σ21,B σ
2
2,E ≥ 1/16 (7)
must hold (and is saturated for this class of cloners),
where σ21,B and σ
2
2,E are the variances of the errors that
affect Bob’s X1 measurements and Eve’s X2 measure-
ments, respectively. For example, if basis 1 is used,
then the outcomes of X1 measurements on Bob’s side
will be distributed as a Gaussian of variance σ21 + σ
2
1,B
since cloning-induced errors are superimposed on the in-
trinsic fluctuations of the squeezed states. Similarly,
a second no-cloning uncertainty relation holds, con-
necting Bob’s errors on X2 and Eve’s errors on X1:
σ22,B σ
2
1,E ≥ 1/16. Let us now characterize the clon-
ers that saturate these inequalities by two parameters
χ and γ: we rewrite the error variances on Bob’s side
as σ21,B = χγ(σ
2
1/α) and σ
2
2,B = χγ
−1(σ22/α), while the
errors on Eve’s side are written as σ21,E = χ
−1γ(σ21/α)
and σ22,E = χ
−1γ−1(σ21/α). Thus, χ characterizes the
balance between Bob’s and Eve’s errors as σ1,B/σ1,E =
σ2,B/σ2,E = χ. The limit χ→ 0 corresponds to the case
where Bob has a negligible cloning-induced additional
error on his measured quadratures, so he gets the entire
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information I0 (Eve does not get any information). The
case χ = 1 represents a symmetric situation where the er-
rors induced by cloning are the same for Bob and Eve. Of
course, the limit χ → ∞ is the opposite situation where
Eve gets most of the information with no error. Simi-
larly, γ describes the quadrature 1 vs 2 balance, that is,
σ1,B/σ2,B = σ1,E/σ2,E = γ(σ1/σ2).
Now, we need to express the information processed
from Alice to Bob (or from Alice to Eve) in basis 1 (or ba-
sis 2). In basis 1, the variance of Bob’s measurement out-
comes is σ21+σ
2
1,B = (1+χγ/α)σ
2
1, while the distribution
of the key elements has a variance Σ21. Using Shannon’s
formula, Eq. (3), and the identity 1 + Σ21/σ
2
1 = 1/α
2, we
obtain the information processed from Alice to Bob in
basis 1:
I1,B =
1
2
log2
(
1 + αχγ
α2 + αχγ
)
(8)
Similarly, using the variance of Eve’s outcomes in basis 2,
σ22 + σ
2
2,E = [1 + 1/(χγα)]σ
2
2 , an analogous calculation
yields for Eve’s information in basis 2
I2,E =
1
2
log2
(
1 + α/(χγ)
α2 + α/(χγ)
)
(9)
Finally, the balance between Bob’s and Eve’s information
can be expressed by calculating the sum of equations (8)
and (9):
I1,B + I2,E =
1
2
log2(1/α
2) = I0 (10)
Remarkably, it appears that the information acquired by
Eve on the second quadrature, I2,E , is exactly counter-
balanced by the defect of information at Bob’s side on
the first quadrature, I0 − I1,B . Of course, the counter-
part of Eq. (10) also holds when interchanging the bases,
that is, I2,B + I1,E = I0.
Thus, assuming that the use of the continuous cloner
is the best possible individual attack against our continu-
ous cryptographic protocol, Bob’s information loss can be
viewed as a proper disturbance measure as it simply is an
upper bound on the information that might potentially
have been gained by an eavesdropper. Consequently, the
net amount of key bits that can be generated by this
method is bounded by IB − IE = I0 − 2IE . This follows
from [23] where it is proven that the secret key rate of
A and B with respect to E is lower bounded by the dif-
ference of mutual information I(A;B) − I(A;E). Even
though A, B and E here denote continuous variables,
we can use this result provided that the generated key
and the exchanged reconciliation messages are discrete
as required in [23]. Our continuous variables A, B and E
only appear at the right of the conditional bar in entropy
formulas, so they can be approximated by discrete num-
bers (that is, they can be replaced by an integer such as
⌊nA⌋, approximating the real variable A). As n grows,
it will soon be close to the real variable with a precision
far beyond what is needed given the noise level. Thus,
we conclude that our protocol can only work provided
that IE < I0/2, that is, iff χ < 1. Stated otherwise, the
quality of the signals measured by Alice and Bob must
be bounded by IB > I0/2, or in terms of signal-to-noise
ratios γ′ >
√
1 + γ−1, where γ′ is the SNR measured by
Bob. This means that a 1-bit channel (γ = 3) may still be
used if the noise power is almost tripled (γ′ > 1). In sum-
mary, the procedure we propose here consists in the quan-
tum distribution of a (real) Gaussian key, followed by a
discretization procedure so as to apply some (discrete)
reconciliation and privacy amplification protocol. Such
a strategy avoids a weakness of the squeezed-state cryp-
tosystems as presented in Refs. [12–14]. There, the key
is binary (or belong to a larger finite alphabet), so there
are always gaps between the discrete key values. This al-
lows Eve to gain knowledge about the occurrences where
she measured the wrong quadrature (without getting the
key value). This knowledge alone is sufficient for her to
attack this key distribution scheme simply by omitting to
resend the corresponding key elements to Bob, thereby
faking a small attenuation in the transmission. This lim-
itation does not apply to our scheme since the continuous
key values fill in an entire region in the (X1, X2) phase
space.
In conclusion, an all-continuous quantum crypto-
graphic protocol was proposed that is based on single-
mode squeezed states of the electromagnetic field. It ex-
ploits the uncertainty relation between the conjugate pair
of quadrature components X1 and X2 by encoding a con-
tinuous Gaussian-distributed key into either X1- or X2-
squeezed states, thereby allowing a continuous key distri-
bution between two remote parties. It is shown that the
information acquired by an eavesdropper on the key ele-
ments encoded in X1 is compensated by a reduction (by
a same amount) of the key information available on the
X2 amplitude at the receiver’s station. This information-
theoretic tradeoff characterizes the worst-case individual
attack based on the cloning machine, so we conclude that
the loss of information at the receiver’s end is a good up-
per bound on the tapped information. A realization of
this continuous protocol based on squeezed states would
be very challenging, as the generation of squeezed light
has been a difficult experimental target for years. Also,
it would require synchronized local oscillators at Alice’s
and Bob’s stations, in order for them to have a common
phase for homodyne detecting the amplitudesX1 andX2.
In addition, probably the main limitation in the imple-
mentation of this protocol is related to the loss of squeez-
ing effected by attenuation in the transmission medium.
This would dramatically decrease the SNR, and make
the protocol less efficient (or insecure). In analogy with
what is known for BB84, there probably is a threshold
on the squeeze parameter that Alice should reach, below
which the protocol would fail. Nevertheless, it should
be stressed that the cryptographic protocol proposed
here was analyzed using the conjugate pair X1 and X2,
but other complementary variables might be exploited as
4
well. In particular, one could possibly imagine a contin-
uous cryptographic scheme based on the time-frequency
complementarity, where ultra-short single-photon pulses,
or, alternatively, single-photon pulses that are highly re-
solved in frequency would be used in order to encode the
Gaussian key. Such a scheme might possibly avoid some
of the weaknesses of the squeezed state protocol, and be
more appropriate for an experimental realization.
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